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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-JUVENILES-STATE LAW AUTHORIZING PRETRIAL DETENTION OF JUVENILES UPON A
FINDING OF RISK OF FUTURE CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR UPHELD AS VALID UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE. Schall v.
Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).
Three juveniles, detained before trial pursuant to section 320.5(3)(b)
of the New York Family Court Act,1 instituted a habeas corpus class
action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York seeking a declaratory judgment that the Act violated the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.2 After a full trial on the
merits, the district court declared the statute unconstitutional. 3 The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed. 4 The United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 320.5(3)(b) does not violate
due process because preventive detention serves a legitimate state interest
sufficient to justify abridgment of the detained juvenile's liberty interest. 5
The Court also held that the Act contains adequate procedural safeguards to prevent unnecessary or arbitrary impairment of constitutionally protected rights. 6
The constitutional rights of juveniles have developed within the
framework of a court system separate from that dealing with adults. 7 At
1. New York Family Court Act, N.Y. JUD. LAW § 320.5(3)(b) (1983). Section
320.5(3)(b) provides:
The Court shall not direct detention unless it finds and states the facts and
reasons for so finding that unless the respondent is detained;
(a) there is a substantial probability that he will not appear in court on
the return date; or
(b) there is a serious risk that he may before the return date commit an
act which if committed by an adult would constitute a crime.
ld.
2. United States ex rei. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691 (S.D. N.Y. 1981), affd,
689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403
(1984). The juveniles also alleged that the statute violated equal protection because
it applied only to juveniles and not to adults. The district court dismissed this
claim, holding that the states do have a right to differentiate between adults and
juveniles. ld. at 706.
3. United States ex rei. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691, 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1981),
affd, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403
(1984). The district court held that the statute violated due process because: (1) it
gives the judge a license to act arbitrarily in predicting the likelihood of future criminal conduct; (2) pretrial detention without a prior adjudication or probable cause is
per se unconstitutional; and, (3) pretrial detention constitutes punishment that is
constitutionally prohibited under the due process clause. ld. at 707.
4. Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Schall v. Martin,
104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984). The court of appeals found that most juveniles considered
sufficiently dangerous by the family court to justify pretrial detention are actually
released within days or weeks. ld. at 369. Thus, the court concluded that the vast
majority of pretrial detention involves either mistakes in judgment fostered by the
procedurally and substantively unlimited terms of section 320.5(3), or imposition of
incarceration solely as punishment for unadjudicated crimes. ld. at 373.
5. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2406 (1984).
6. ld. at 2417.
7. Comment, The Supreme Court and Pretrial Detention 0/ Juveniles: A Principled
Solution to a Due Process Dilemma, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 95, 98 (1983).
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the inception of the juvenile court system, 8 wide differences were tolerated between the procedural rights given to adults and those given to
children. 9 Treatment and rehabilitation, rather than punishment, formed
the goals of the juvenile court movement. \0 It was believed that these
goals could best be achieved by relaxing strict rules of evidence and procedure and allowing the "fatherly" family court judge broad discretion in
determining each child's needs. II
In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has recognized a gap
between the originally benign ideals of the juvenile court system and its
realities. 12 The Court has noted, "there is evidence, in fact, that there
may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both
worlds: that he gets neither the protection accorded to adults nor the
solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children."13
Thus, the Court has held that certain basic constitutional protections enjoyed by adults accused of a crime must also be made available to
juveniles involved in delinquency proceedings. 14 Furthermore, the Court
has held that delinquency proceedings must also comply with the "fundamental fairness" requirement of due process. IS Only where a due process right might destroy the traditional character of juvenile proceedings
and where other available procedural rights will give the juvenile sufficient protections, has the Court refused to extend adult due process protections to the juvenile system. 16
Although the Court had sketched the constitutional framework of
juvenile adjudicatory rights prior to Schall v. Martin,17 it had never confronted issues concerning juvenile preadjudicatory rights. 18 The Court
also had never ruled on the constitutionality of detaining any individual,
adult or juvenile, for the purpose of preventing future crime. 19 The traditional justification for pretrial detention has been the state's interest in
8. The first American juvenile court was established in Cook County, Illinois in 1899.
For a discussion of the development of the juvenile court system, see generally S.
DAVIS, THE RIGHTS OF JUVENILES 1 (1974).
9. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 (1966).
10. Id. at 15-16.
11. S. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 3.
12. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528 (1975).
13. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
14. E.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (double jeopardy); In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (notice
of charges; right to counsel; privilege against self-incrimination; right to confrontation and cross-examination).
15. See Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 531 (1975); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S.
528, 543 (1971).
16. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (no right to jury trial in
juvenile proceeding because a full adversary process might end the idealistic concept
of an informal, protective proceeding).
17. 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).
18. Comment, supra note 7, at 100.
19. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2410 (1984).
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ensuring the presence of the accused at trial,20 and the Court has held
that detention for this limited purpose is not a violation of due process. 21
In Bell v. Wolfish,22 however, the Court specifically left open whether any
governmental interest other than ensuring a detainee's presence at trial
may constitutionally justify pretrial detention. 23 Although only the District of Columbia permits pretrial detention of adults for the purpose of
preventing harm to the community,24 several states allow detention of
juveniles accused of committing a crime for reasons other than ensuring
their presence at trial, such as protecting the community and the juvenile
from the possibility of future criminal conduct. 25 At least eight state
courts have upheld the constitutionality of juvenile preventive detention
statutes. 26
The mere invocation of a legitimate state interest, however, will not
justify restrictions and conditions of pretrial detention that amount to
punishment. 27 Due process also requires that a person not be punished
prior to a finding of guilt. 28 Therefore, it is necessary to determine
whether detention has been instituted for a punitive purpose. This determination generally depends upon whether there is any alternative purpose to which the restriction rationally may be connected, and whether
the restriction appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. 29 The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia has applied
20. Tribe, An Ounce of Detention: Preventive Justice in the World of John Mitchell, 56
VA. L. REV. 371, 376-77 (1970).
21. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979); see also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420. U.S. 103,
114 (1975) (government may lawfully detain a suspect prior to a determination of
guilt); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951) (right to release before trial is conditioned upon adequate assurance of presence at trial and submission to sentence if
found guilty).
22. 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
23. Id. at 534 n.15.
24. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1321 to 1322 (1981 & Supp. 1983). The Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia upheld the constitutionality of this statute in United
States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022
(1982).
25. E.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-59(a)(I)-(4) (1975); DEL. FAM. Cr. R. 60; ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 37, §§ 703-4 (1983-84 Supp.); MD. Crs. & IUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3815(b) (1984); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6325 (1982); VA. CODE § 16.1-248
(1982); see also Comment, A Due Process Dilemma: Pretrial Detention in Juvenile
Delinquency Proceedings, 11 I. MAR. I. PRAC. & PROC. 513, 518-25 (1978) (containing a thorough review of the preventive detention statutes in all fifty states).
26. Aubrey v. Gadbois, 50 Cal. App. 3d 470, 123 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975); L.O.W. v.
District Court of Arapahoe, 623 P.2d 1253 (Colo. 1981); Pauley v. Gross, 1 Kan.
App. 2d 736, 574 P.2d 234 (1977); Baker v. Smith, 477 S.W.2d 149 (Ky. 1971);
State v. Gleason, 404 A.2d 573 (Me. 1979); People ex reI. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39
N.Y.2d 682, 350 N.E.2d 906, 385 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1976); Commonwealth ex reI.
Sprawal v. Hendrick, 438 Pa. 435, 265 A.2d 348 (1970); Morris v. D'Amario, 416
A.2d 137 (R.I. 1980).
27. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2412 (1984).
28. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).
29. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). Although other criterion for determining whether a restraint constitutes punishment were also men-
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this test to its adult preventive detention statute and has held that the
intent of the legislature to protect the community is a valid "alternative
purpose" sufficient to qualify the statute as regulatory rather than penal. 30 The Schall decision, however, was the first Supreme Court holding
authorizing pretrial detention to protect the community and the juvenile.
Even if there is no punitive purpose behind preventive detention, the
denial of individual liberty still requires compliance with the mandates of
procedural due process. 31 In determining the scope of procedural protections required by the due process clause, the Supreme Court in Mathews
v. Eldridge 32 developed a test requiring a balancing of three factors: the
private interests affected by a proceeding, the countervailing governmental interests involved, and the risk that the procedures chosen will lead to
an erroneous decision. 33
The private interests implicated when an individual is faced with
incarceration are obvious. The Supreme Court has recognized in the
adult context the "serious impact on the individual" that pretrial detention entails: the disruption of personal and professional life, the subjection to stark conditions of the person detained, and the serious
consequences of confinement on trial preparation. 34 The Court has implied that the private interests at stake in juvenile proceedings are comparable to those at stake in adult criminal prosecutions. 35 In addition,
numerous courts 36 and commentators 37 have recognized the specific detriment to which a detained juvenile may be subjected. No matter how

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

36.

tioned in Mendoza-Martinez, the Supreme Court in Schall focused on "alternative
purpose." Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2413 (1984).
United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1331-32 (D.C. 1981) (upholding the constitutionality of the District of Columbia's preventive detention statute), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in relevant part: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
Id. at 335; see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982) (applying Eldridge
test); Lassiter v. Department of Social Service, 452 U.S. 18,27 (1981) (same).
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532-33 (1972).
See, e.g., Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530 (1975) (In terms of potential consequences, there is little to distinguish a juvenile adjudicatory hearing with a traditional criminal prosecution); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365 (1970) (the same
considerations that demand extreme caution in factfinding to protect the innocent
adult apply as well to the innocent child); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967) (a
proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found "delinquent" and
subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony
prosecution).
See, e.g., Moss v. Weaver, 525 F.2d 1258, 1260 (5th Cir. 1976) ("[p]retrial detention
is an onerous experience, especially for juveniles"); Cox v. Turley, 506 F.2d 1347,
1359 (6th Cir. 1974) ("courts also particularly take judicial notice that it is not
uncommon to find the indiscriminate mixing of hardened criminals, including sexual assaulters, with young offenders"); Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck,
346 F. Supp. 1354, 1364 (D.R.1. 1972) ("[i]nstead of mother and father and sisters
and brothers and friends and classmates, his world is peopled by guards, custodians,
state employees and delinquents confined with him"); In re William M., 3 Cal. 3d
16,31 n.25, 473 P.2d 737,747 n.25, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33,43 n.25 (1970) ("[it] is difficult
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brief, pretrial detention has an adverse impact on a child's schooling and
work opportunities. 38 Furthermore, because children are often more vulnerable and impressionable than adults,39 incarceration may actually be a
tnore devastating experience for a child than it would be for an adult. 40
Thus, whether a potential detainee is a juvenile or an adult, the interest
in remaining free from institutional restraint is substantia1. 41
An individual's interest in pretrial liberty must be weighed against
the countervailing governmental interests in pretrial detention. The governmental interests asserted as justification for pretrial detention are the
protection of the community and the juvenile from the possibility of future criminal conduct by the juvenile. 42 The interest in preventing future
crime is of great importance and the Supreme Court has stressed that
crime prevention is a "weighty social objective."43 The state's interest in
guarding against future crime, however, is valid only to the extent that
pretrial detention actually prevents the commission of a crime. 44
The difficulty in predicting whether a juvenile will commit a crime if
not detained requires consideration of the third factor of the Eldridge
test: the risk that the procedures used will lead to erroneous and unnecessary deprivation of liberty. Several commentators believe that there is an
inherent risk of error in detention decisions that call for predictions of
future criminal conduct because there are no diagnostic tools available
that would enable even the most highly trained criminologists to predict
which individuals will engage in future crime. 45 The Supreme Court,
however, has rejected the contention that procedures calling for predic-

37.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

43.
44.

45.

for an adult who has not been through the experience to realize the terror that
engulfs a youngster the first time he loses his liberty.").
Eg., R. SARRI, UNDER LOCK AND KEY: JUVENILES IN JAILS AND DETENTION
(1974); Aubry, The Nature, Scope and Significance of Pre-Trial Detention of
Juveniles in California, 1 BLACK L.J. 160, 164 (1971); Komisaruk, Psychiatric Issues
in the Incarceration of Juveniles, 21 Juv. Cr. JUDGES J. 117 (1971).
See Brief for Appellee at 55, Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n.1I (1982).
Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2424 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,27 (1967) ("The fact of the matter is that, however euphemistic the title, a 'receiving home' or an 'industrial school' for juveniles is an institution of confinement. . . .").
See supra note 25 and accompanying text. Prior to Schall, the Supreme Court had
never ruled on whether any governmental objective other than ensuring the detainee's presence at trial could constitutionally justify pretrial detention. Schall v.
Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2410 (1984); see also supra notes 18-22 and accompanying
text.
.
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
See Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365, 377 (2d Cir. 1982) (Newman, J., concurring)
(pretrial detention does not further crime prevention if the prediction of further
criminal behavior is highly uncertain), rev'd sub nom. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct.
2403 (1984).
E.g., Cocozza & Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness:
Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084, 1094-1101 (1976); Diamond, The Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 440
(1974); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693, 696 (1974); Ervin, Preventive Deten-
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tions of future criminality are inherently unsound. 46 The Court has held
that such predictive judgments invariably become an important element
in many decisions affecting liberty interests,47 and, therefore, the difficulty of such determinations does not mean that they cannot be made. 48
In Schall v. Martin,49 the Supreme Court decided for the first time
whether pretrial detention of juveniles for the purpose of preventing future crime is compatible with the "fundamental fairness" required by due
process. 50 The Court noted that to answer this question two separate
inquiries were necessary: first, whether preventive detention serves a legitimate state interest; and, second, whether there are adequate procedural safeguards available to authorize detaining an individual. 51
Answering the first inquiry, the Schall Court noted that there is a
legitimate and compelling state interest in protecting the community
from crime. 52 Furthermore, society has an interest in protecting a juvenile from the consequences of his criminal conduct. 53 In recognizing the
legitimacy of the state's interest in preventive detention, the Court found
significant the widespread use, and judicial acceptance among the states,
of preventive detention of juveniles. 54 Although the Court acknowledged
that juveniles have a countervailing interest in remaining free from institutional restraint, it reasoned that this interest is lessened because
juveniles are "always in some form of custody."55 Children are assumed
to be subject to the control of their parents, or of the state if parental

46.
47.

48.
49.
50.
51.

52.

53.
54.

55.

tion: An Empirical Analysis, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 378 (1970); Tribe,
supra note 20, at 378.
See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-75 (1976).
E.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983) (segregation of a prisoner); Connecticut
Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458 (1981) (commutation of a sentence);
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1
(1979) (grant or denial of parole); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (imposition of
the death penalty); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (revocation of parole).
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274-76 (1976).
104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).
Id. at 2409.
Id. The Court noted that in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 n.15 (1979), it had
specifically left open whether any governmental objective other than ensuring a detainee's presence at trial could constitutionally justify pretrial detention. Schall v.
Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2410 (1984).
Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2410 (citing DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 155 (1960)).
De Veau involved a challenge to a state statute that disqualified from office any person convicted of a felony. The Court held that the challenged state legislation was
part of a program to vindicate a legitimate and compelling state interest in combatting local crime infesting a particular industry. DeVeau, 363 U.S. at 155.
Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2411 (childhood "is a time and condition of life when a person
may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage") (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982)).
Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2411. The Court noted that all states and the District of Columbia have statutes authorizing preventive detention of juveniles and that eight
states have upheld the constitutionality of their statutes with specific reference to
protecting the juvenile and the community from pretrial crime. Id.; see supra notes
24-25 and accompanying text.
Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2410.
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control falters. 56 Thus, the Court characterized detention as merely a
transfer of custody from the parent to the state, and held that, in appropriate circumstances, the juvenile's liberty interest may be subordinate to
the state's parens patriae interest in preserving the welfare of the child. 57
The Court concluded that preventive detention of juveniles serves a legitimate regulatory purpose compatible with due process. 58
After weighing the private and state interests involved in pretrial
detention, the Court noted the due process requirement that punishment
not be imposed prior to an adjudication of guilt. 59 Thus, the Schall
Court found it necessary to decide whether pretrial detention is instituted
for the purpose of punishment, or whether it serves some other "alternative purpose."60 Applying this test to the New York preventive detention
statute, the Court first found that the limited time frames 61 and conditions 62 of confinement reflected a regulatory purpose for detention rather
than a punitive purpose. 63 The Court also rejected the contention that,
because the vast majority of juveniles detained either have their petitions
dismissed before adjudication or are released immediately following adjudication, the underlying purpose of the statute is punitive. 64 The Court
reasoned that a delinquency petition can be dismissed for numerous reasons collateral to the merits of the case, such as the failure of a witness to
testify, and, therefore, the final disposition of a case is "largely irrelevant" to the legality of the pretrial detention. 65
The majority applied the third factor of the Eldridge 66 test to answer whether the procedures of New York's preventive detention statute
provide sufficient protection against erroneous and unnecessary deprivation of liberty.67 The Court first noted that the Act entitles a juvenile to
56.Id.
57.Id.
58. Id. at 2412.
59. Id. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979».
60. Id. at 2413 (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963».
61. Id. Detention pursuant to the Act is strictly limited in time. A juvenile accused of
committing a serious crime can be detained no longer than seventeen days prior to a
fact-finding hearing. A juvenile accused of committing a less serious crime can be
detained no longer than six days. New York Family Court Act, N.Y. JUD. LAW
§ 340.1 (1983).
62. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2413. Nonsecure detention involves an open facility in the
community without locks, bars, or security officers. Secure detention is more restrictive, but children are still assigned to separate dorms based on age, size, and behavior, and they are provided with educational and recreational programs. Id. A
juvenile cannot, absent exceptional circumstances, be sent to a prison where he
would be exposed to adult criminals. New York Family Court Act, N.Y. JUD. LAW
§ 304.1 (2) (1983).
63. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2414.
64.Id.
65. Id. at 2415.
66. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). For a discussion of the Eldridge
test see supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
67. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403, 2415 (1984).
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a formal probable cause hearing within three days of detention. 68 The
juveniles who had been detained, however, claimed that detention decisions are intrinsically arbitrary because the statute contains no objective
criteria to guide the judge in deciding who should be detained. 69 The
Court rejected this claim by holding that the right to a hearing, to counsel and to a statement of facts, make it unnecessary to list in a statute
specific factors that a judge must follow in the detention decision. 70 The
Court found no reason for a federal court to assume that a state judge
would not apply state law as conscientiously as possible. 71 The Schall
Court further reasoned that because the family court must exercise a substitute parental function, a juvenile detention statute should not contain
any particularized criteria. 72
The detained juveniles also claimed that pretrial detention decisions
are inherently arbitrary because they are based on a prediction of future
crime, a prediction that is virtually impossible to make accurately.73 The
Schall Court, reaffirming earlier decisions,74 held that a prediction of future criminal conduct can be made accurately.75 The Court stated that
such a prediction is an experienced one based upon a number of variables
that cannot be easily codified. Furthermore, there are adequate post-detention procedures, such as habeas corpus review, appeals, and motions
for reconsideration, that provide a sufficient mechanism for correcting
any erroneous detention on a case by case basis.76
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Marshall found persuasive the
findings of the lower court 77 that the vast majority of juveniles detained
under the Act are released prior to or immediately following adjudication.78 These findings indicate that most juvenile detainees, when examined more carefully than at their initial appearance, are deemed
insufficiently dangerous to warrant further incarceration. 79 The dissent
stated that this situation seems to undercut the governmental purpose
68. Id. at 2416; see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975) (a judicial determination
of probable cause is a prerequisite to any extended restraint of an adult accused of a
crime). The Gerstein Court did not, however, mandate a specific timetable of what
was to be considered "extended restraint" or how soon after detention a probable
cause hearing was to be held. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2415.
69. See Brief for Appellee at 64-65, Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984) (the seriousness of the crime, the nature of the proof, and the necessary degree of probability are
all relegated to the discretion of the family court judge).
70. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2418.
71. Id.
72.Id.
73. Id. at 2417; see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
75. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2417.
76. Id. at 2418 (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979».
77. Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365,369 (2d Cir. 1982) (affg 513 F. Supp. 691 (S.~.
N.Y. 181), rev'd sub nom. Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).
78. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2420-22 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
79. /d. at 2427 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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assigned to the statute by the majority, because the state's interest in
preserving the welfare of the child and protecting the community is insufficient where the juvenile, if freed, would probably not have committed a crime. 80
Justice Marshall also disagreed with the majority's finding that the
statute provides adequate procedural guidelines to guard against erroneous deprivation of liberty.81 He noted that the statute is not limited to
classes of juveniles whose past conduct suggests that they are substantially more likely than the average person to commit a future crime. Furthermore, the statute permits detention of juveniles who have been
arrested for even trivial offenses and who have no prior record. 82 The
high rate of error in these detention decisions is reflected by comparing
the number of juveniles held pretrial to the number ultimately incarcerated following adjudication. 83 Thus, the dissent concluded that the net
effect of the statute is overwhelmingly detrimental, and that none of the
asserted governmental interests sufficiently outweighs the harmful effect
of the Act on the juveniles who come within its purview. 84
Despite contrary precedent,85 the Schall decision indicates that the
liberty interests of juveniles are less vital than those of adults. Although
the Court has held in In re Gault 86 and In re Winship 87 that delinquency
proceedings must comport with the fundamental fairness required by the
fourteenth amendment, its decision in Schall indicates weakened support
for juvenile rights. In upholding a statutory scheme that is so clearly
violative of due process,88 the Court indicates its willingness to deal with
juveniles outside established principles of law applicable to adult
offenders.
As the dissent noted, "if the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process
Clause means anything, it means freedom from institutional restraint."89
The Schall majority down played the importance of this principle by discounting the impact of incarceration on juveniles. The Court implied
80. [d. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
81. [d. at 2427-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
82. [d. at 2430 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In contrast to the Family Court Act, the
District of Columbia's adult detention statute, which was upheld in United States v.
Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321 (D.C. App. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1022 (1982), authorizes detention only if the person is charged with one of a prescribed set of dangerous crimes and only if the judge finds there is a substantial probability that the
defendant committed the crime. D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-1322(b)(2)(c) (1981).
83. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2427 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The vast majority of persons
detained under the Family Court Act are released either before or immediately fol~
lowing their trials. [d. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
84. [d. at 2433 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
85. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
86. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
87. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
88. One commentator alleges that the constitutional arguments against preventive detention are so numerous that "their recitation looks like the model answer to an
issue-spotting question on a law school examination." Ervin, supra note 25, at 297.
89. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2423 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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that because juveniles are subject to parental control, their liberty interests are less important than those of an adult.90 There is, however, a
significant difference between parental control and imprisonment. In attempting to analogize the two, the majority disregards the realities of
juvenile detention. 91
The Schall Court would have better served both society and the juvenile justice system had it declared the New York preventive detention
statute unconstitutional. Such a holding would have provided the legislature with an opportunity to reevaluate the entire process surrounding
detention. Possibly, the legislature then could have developed detention
procedures that were less arbitrarily applied and that offered some degree
of respect for the due process rights of juveniles. For example, pretrial
detention could have been limited to apply only to juveniles charged with
one of a prescribed set of violent crimes and, even then, only if a judge
found that there was probable cause to believe that the individual committed the crime. The statute could have been further limited to apply
only to juveniles with a past record of criminal behavior or whose past
conduct suggested that they were substantially more likely than the average person to commit a crime prior to trial. These objective criteria
would have served as a guide to family court judges in deciding whether
to detain and would have reduced the unbridled discretion that is permitted under the current preventive detention statute. However, the
Supreme Court chose to allow the practice of discretionary detention of
juveniles to continue. By so choosing, the Court disregards the widespread agreement that too many juveniles are unnecessarily and inappropriately detained throughout the United States. 92 Current detention
practices have done much to undermine the credibility of the juvenile
court system. Preventive detention imposes incarceration without a finding of guilt, thereby undermining the presumption of innocence. Such a
practice downgrades the importance of an individual's right to be free
from arbitrary and unnecessary confinement, and is at odds with our society's value system which places such high regard on freedom.
Kim Detrick

90. Id. at 2410.
91. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting); see supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text.
92. See Amicus Brief, Youth Law Center and the Juvenile Law Center of Philadelphia,
at 6, Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).

